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Editorial 
CAMPAIGN AGAINST REPRESSION 
WILL CONTINUE 
With the official conclusion of KOPKAMTIB's 3-year 
release programme, TAPOL is being asked whether it will 
continue to campaign. As a TAPOL representative told 
Tempo (29 De<:ember 1979), "TAPOL will continue to be 
active because it campaigns not only for G30S/PKI 
prisoners but for all people detained because of their 
political views". Many problems still remain: 
Tried Tapols and Those Awaiting Trial 
This issue is largely devoted to an 1ntetim analysis of the 
hundreds of political trials held since 1965. A major part of 
T APO L's work during the coming period will be devoted to 
completing this study which concerns not only the trials 
as such but also the role they have played in underpinning 
the military government's claim to legitimacy. Comments 
on this analysis are welcome, as well as help tin obtaining 
additional material. At the same time, we shall campaign 
for the release of all tried and A-category tapols. 
The 1965 Tapols 
Now that KOPKAMTIB claims there are no more B-cate-
gory tapols, an independent assessment is essential. Nearly 
200 ex-tapols, half with their families, are still on Buru; 
KOPKAMTIB claims they "opted" to remain. A thousand 
or so tapols or ex.tapols are in labour camps in Kalimantan, 
with others in Sulawesi; they too are said to be there 
"voluntan1yu. As we were going to press, news was received 
that one Buru prisoner is now detained in Wirogunan Prison, 
Jogjakarta, in order to testify at a forthcomong trial. Just 
'Tapol' is an Indonesian contraction for 'tahanan 
politik' meaning political prisoner. It is still widely 
\used although it was banned in 1974 because the 
military authorities said that all prisoners are 
'criminals'. 
prior to the December releases, fears were expressed that 
some tapols would be mixed with people on criminal 
charges so they could not be identified. With KOPKAMTIB 
figures unreliable right up to the last (see page 18) there is 
no way of confirming that 33,094 were actually released, or 
indeed that this was the number of B-category tapols 
eligible for release. 
Complete Amnesty for All Released Tapols 
Ex-tapols released in the past few years face serious discri-
mination which obstructs their rehabilitation and cff orts to 
make a living. Am1y officers often call upon society "to 
welcome them back" but this is hypocritical because it is 
the Army which officially excludes them from the public 
sector. the Armed Forces and "vital" industries. 
The Government must be pressed to issue an edict 
granting amnesty and abolition (amnesd dan abolis:) to 
everyone held in connection with the G30S/PKI affair. As 
a precedent, this was granted by the Sukarno Govern· 
ment to all those held for alleged involvement in regional 
rebellions in the late 1950s. Some government officials 
argue that the G30S/PK1 is ... different" because it involves 
"ideology'', but surely, this is all the more reason why com-
plete amnesty must be granted! 
Amnesty and abolition means clearing the names of all 
those victimised, and fonnally deleting the "G30S/PKI 
affair" as an issue for discrimination of any kind. It is 
essential for the complete restoration of civil rights to tens 
of thousands victimised for so long for political reasons. 
... 
Other Political Prisoners 
Many student leaders have spent time in detention in the 
past few years; 36 were tried and all verdicts so far have 
been -guilty, with sentences ranging from 9 months to two 
continued on page 20 
Received from 
an ex-tapol 
NEW YEAR'S GREETINGS TO 
ALL GOOD FRIENDS ABROAD! 
On behalf of many friends here, I wish you a Happy Wirogunart Prison, and is now being cared for by his 
New Year and new successes in 1980. grandmother in Kebumen, Central Java; Sugeng 
Over the past 14 years or so, you have given us Maryono, formerly an activist, is paralysed and _b now 
enonnous support, political, moral and material, and liVing in Ngawi, East Java; ex-Member of Parliament 
have been able to force the military government Hutomo Supardan is paralysed and is living in 
- to halt the mass murder of Indonesian people, Bandung. In most cases, their families live in extreme 
- to soften its inhuman attitude towards the Indo- hardship as a result of the political treatment they 
nesian people, particularly towards political have experienced which makes it very difficult for 
prisoners and their f amilles, them to care for these sick people. 
- to release all C- and B-category political prisoners, Besides all this, we are living today under a 
and military dictatorship, with no real democracy or buic 
- to allow us to survive though some of us have been human rights. People can be arrested and detained by 
crippled physically and mentally as a result of the government on any pretext, at any time. Working 
brutal tortu1es. people get very low wages (some as low as Rp 100* a 
Please accept our boundless thanks for this invalu- day) with no right to defend themselves; peasants are 
able help. May God repay you for all you have done. cheated of their land on numerous pretexts without 
Without your help it would not have been possible to being able to defend themselves; unemployment is 
achieve all tlrls because dark forces and the military rocketing and together with it, homelessness, crime 
government here were intent upon our complete and prostitution. Prices of essential goods are soaring 
annihilation. and there is a continual decline in the already meagre 
A-category prisoners, those still awaiting trial, are real earnings of the people. Taxation and other levies 
still being held, as well as those who are serving sen- are increasing. More and more children a.re failing to 
tem~es. In these trials, the cliarges are fabricated by ftnd places in the schools. Domestic production, 
those in power, and the verdicts and sentences are expecially of basic necessities, is declining whilst 
fixed before the court's judgement is made without &b.ose in ·power get richer and richer. Corruption is 
regard for the evidence and defence presented by the worsening. On the other hand, students, intellectuals 
accused. We earnestly hope that you will help us by and other well-meaning people are deprived the right 
pressing the Indonesian Government to release them to freely express their views. 
immediately. . The Indonesian people are striving in many ways 
And we also need your help to alleviate the hard- to bring about a system of democracy in which basic 
ships of those who a.re ailing as a result of past human rights and justice can be upheld. We urgently 
torture. To mention but a few: ex-Colonel Abdul need your help-political, mor.al and material. Just as, 
Latief is suffering from unhealed gunshot and in past years, your help has been effective in attaining 
bayonet wounds in both legs inflicted at the time of its objective, so now we are convinced that the help 
his arrest, and is serving a sentence in Cipinang we feel sure you will provide will be succe§ful, and 
Prison, Jakarta~ fonner mayor of Magelang, Argo democracy,justice,humanita.rianism and basic human 
lsmoyo has asthma with complications and is serving rights will prevail in the end. 
a sentence in Wirog\man Prison, Jogjakarta; Widadgo, Please accept our most fervent greetin~. 
a former medical student at Gaja Mada University, is Indonesia, 31.December1979. 
l paralysed and dumb as a result of torture while at •$LOO= Rp. 624. 
"'-._____ _____________ ___, 
3 - YEAR RELEASE PLAN ENDS 
On a December, 105 tapols were released in Jakarta and 
other towns bnnging to a formal conclusion KOPKAMTIB's 
three-year release programme during which, according to its 
commander, Admiral Sudomo, 33,094 B-Category tapols 
were freed (Tempo, 29 December, 1979). The fmal 105 
tapols had had their releases delayed because, it was 
claimed, they were "unco-operative". 
KOPKAMTIB now asserts that there are no more G30S/ 
PK.I prisoners being held, although it still admits to holding 
many hundreds of tried political prisoners as well as almost 
two dozen people awaiting trial (see figures below). It will 
now be necessary to undertake an independent assessment 
of the situation in Indonesia's prisons, camps and military 
offices. Reports from contacts in various parts of the 
country should shortly be coming in. As TAPOL has re-
ported in previous issues, there are many tapoJs 01 ex-tapols 
who are now in labour camps, allegedly as ·~oluntary 
transmigrants", in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and possibly else-
where. There are also 92 fonner tapols and their families 
continutd on page 18 
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INDONESIA'S POLITICAL TRIALS: 'LEGAL' 
DIMENSIONS OF A CONTINUING TRAGEDY 
1,014 people have been tried in Indonesia on political charges since 1966. According 
to our records, nearly 50 per cent were iiven death sentences, life imprisonment or 
20-year sentences. If our records which include nearly 400 verdicts correctly reflect 
the general pattern, there could be about 150 people under sentence of death (minus 
the unknown number already executed) and a similar number of people serving life. 
Indonesia's political trials figure along with political trials in many other countries are 
show trials, totally unrelated to justice and the rule of law. 
All tried prisoners as well as those awaiting trial must be released immediately. We call 
on our readers to support this just demand by exerting pressure on the Indonesian 
Government, 
The fallowing article, by Julie Southwood, summarises the preliminary results of 
TAPOL 's research into the trials. It is hoped that the study will lead to the prep-
aration of a major work on politics and law in Indonesia. 
. .. the state of Indonesia is based upon Law and not based upon 
mere power • .. (Elucidation, 1945 Constitution of the Republic 
of Indonesia) 
Fortunately the massacre of the communists <lid not lead to 
strong protests abroad. Our problem has never been the dead 
communists, but those who are still alive m our prisons and con-
centra1fon camps. (A 'member of the Indonesian Government'.)! 
Indonesia seems to have shed a political problem of 
international significance with the release of what the 
Suharto government describes as "the remainder" of its B-
Category prisoners at the end of 1979. These prisoners have 
been described officially as: 
those for whom strong indications exists (sic) that they played 
similar roles to those of the A-Category' detainees, especially in 
the preparations for the attempted coup. Owing to an insuf· 
ficient amount of evidence so far, they could not yet be brought 
to trial, but neither could they be set free precipitately without 
endangezing national security and stability and their own ufety2 
The fact that there remains a group of prisoners who have 
been tried or who are awaiting trial has gone almost unre-
marked both inside and outside of Indonesia. The official 
description of these A-Category prisoners is: 
1hose who were clearly and directly involved as planners, leaders 
or executioners (lie) in the attempted coup, with sufficient 
evidence of their guilt so that their cases could be brought to the 
court of justice for tria13 
Those who have been tried and sentenced are described as 
nadapols. 4 These prisoners are the victims of a massive state 
intervention in a legal system, and the implications go far 
beyond the suffering of a group of prisoners. This particular 
form of human rights violation represents a present and 
future threat to the basic rights of all Indonesian people. 
One of the most important spheres of opposition to the 
Suharto government today is focussed on the establishment 
of rule of law and the restoration of civil liberties. The ca1l 
for operation of rule of law is of profound importance. 
There can be no doubt that the Indonesian state could no 
longer function in its present form were the rule of law to 
operate effectively. However, so far the government has 
been able to ensure in a variety of ways that the demands 
of the rule of law advocates have remained muted, and 
contained to issues which do not touch upon the issue of 
the A-Category prisoners and nadapols. The events which 
led to the imprisonment and trials of these people were the 
same events which led to the establislunent of the Suharto 
govemmen t. The paradox that rule of law advocates have 
all but ignored the problem of a massive infringement of 
justice and its processes represented by these prisoners, 
begins to come clear when the relationship between law and 
state power in Indonesia is understood, and the hows and 
whys of this relationship starts unfolding when the political 
trials and their prologue are investigated. 
Recognising the dangers of the demands of the rule of 
law advocates who constitute an increasingly vocal, urban 
and predominantly middle-class opposition, President 
Suharto has repeatedly promised that his government 
would respect the rule of law. Yet the government does not 
depend on a legal system, but on its control of a strong, 
centralised apparatus of repression, of which the legal 
system has become a part. Contrary to accepted practice by 
oppressive military regimes, the Indonesian military has not 
found it necessary to abrogate the Constitution. Rather 
the government postures as the upholder of the Constitu-
tion, while at the same time violating it continuously, and 
justifying its excesses on the grounds of "national security". 
Shortly after 1he 1965 'coup' the formidable apparatus, 
KOPKAMTIB (Operational Command for the Restoration 
of Security and Order) was set up for a 'transitional period' 
to deal with the 'coup' "without having to resort to a State 
of Emergency or to Martial Law",S Fourteen years later 
KOPKAMTIB still wields near-absolute powers of arrest and 
interrogation and may be regarded as the embodiment of 
martial law. In 1973 the MPR (Peoples' Consultative 
Assembly) agreed (MPR Decision No. X/MPR/1973) 
T<> give mandate to the Presiden (sic)/Mandatory of the Peoples' 
Consultative Assembly to take nece5sary steps in order to secure 
and to maintain the unity and integrity of the Nation and to pre-
vent the re-occunence of the threat of G30S/PKI6 and other 
tlueats of subversion in safeguarding national development of 
the Pancasila. Democracy 1 and the 1945 Constitution. 8 
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Presidential Decision No. 9/1974 then entrusted KOPKAM· 
TIB to carry out this mandate, and a government publi-
cation9 comments, 
Prevfous e;itperiences of Indonesia in dealing with subversion, 
rebellions and the like, have taught Indonesia a lesson in how to 
cope with these problems and made her more convinced of the 
need to foresee subversion u a latent threat to its internlil 
&ecutity and stability. The e5tablishment of a body that special-
ises in preventing iluch problems, the KOPKAMTl.B, is deemed to 
be the more effective way. 
While the existence of KOPKAMTIB continues to mock the 
legal system, no law refonns can be effective against its abu 
abuses. KOPKAMTIB has in recent years been responsible 
for the arrests and detention of former New Order suppor-
ters who have been outspoken in their demands for basic 
civil liberties. Amongst these arrests were those of Adnan 
Buyung Nasution, the head of the Legal Aid Institute 
(LBH), and Mr Yap Thiam Hien, the defence iawye.r, who 
were both detained without trial after student demonstra-
tions in 1974. Since then many student ~ritics of the regime 
have been detained, and some of them tried. Their trials 
also serve as examples of how a legal system may be pressed 
into the service of a repressive state, and not of justice. Yet 
to say that KOPKAMTIB and the legal system are on oppo-
site sides of the spectrum would be misleading. The so-
called legal system of the Indonesian state is organically 
bound up with the profoundly repressive functions of 
KOPKAMTIB, and it is only a small and courageous group 
within the legal system who have opposed its abuses. 
The Problem of Numbers 
What should be the simplest aspect of the situation of the 
A-Category prisoners and nadapols, ie. how many are 
involved, presents·a problem. In their case, the government 
has been even less rigorous in its statements of their num-
bers than it has been in the case of the B-Category prisoners. 
This may be regarded as symptomatic of the 
absolute disdain with which the government regards the 
legal rights of its political detainees. At the end of 1978, 
General Yoga Sugama, the Chief-of-Staff of KOPKAMTIB 
made the extraordinazy assertion that there was no date on 
the numbers of tried prisoners.10 Previously in 1975, 
Admiral Sudomo, then the KOPKAMT113 Chief-of-Staff, 
had said that "856 hard-core communists have been 
convicted of participation in the G30S".l1 Almost three 
years later, President Suharto in a state address on 11 
March 1978 said that only 894 had been tried, while two 
months earlier the Department of Foreign Affairs said that 
904 had been tried,12 On the occasion of the December 
1979 B-Category releases Sudomo said that 1014 people 
had been tried.13 Whatever the case, the tried prisoners are 
excluded from all official figures about political prisoners as 
a whole. The nur.nber of convictions obtained in the trials 
approximates to the number of defendants because there 
have been virtually no acquittals and so the distinction 
between A-Categocy prisoners and nadapols is a specious 
one. The A-Category prisoners were already condemned by 
the Presidential Instruction 09/KOGAM/1966 which deter-
mined their status on the basis of "sufficient evidence of 
their guilt". 
Government figures of the number of A-Category 
prisoners awaiting trial are hardly more enlightening. Jn 
September 1971, it was acknowledged by General Sugih 
Arto, the Prosecutor General, that there were about 5,000 
A-Category prisoners.14 Jn April 1979 several sources 
stated that the figure was 52 7, while in December 1979 the 
government stated th.at there were only 23 A-Category pri· 
soners left. lS These figures in no way tally ~th the numbers 
of trials held, and no proper explanation has been offered 
for the drops in numbers, beyond some off-hand statements 
that some have been "downgraded" to B-Category. Accor· 
ding to Tempo (29 December 1979), the most recent 
development is that following an Instruction by President 
Suharto to the Minister of Justice that G30S prisonets must 
be given retroactive remission, (which until now has been 
granted often to ordinary convicts, but only to one G30S 
prisoner-Mr Oei Tju Tat), 331 tapols are said to have 
received remission, of whom 118 have been celeased. 
Prologue to the Trials 
As already noted, the rule of law advocates in Indonesia 
have avoided articulating their caBe around the plight of 
tried prisoners, although there is substantial documenta-
tion from the trials which makes a searing indictment of 
the Indonesian legal system. For many people who cam-
paign for legal reforms, the tapols (political prisoners) are 
tainted with the stigma of being communists or communist 
sympathisers and are simply beyond the pale, so that the 
desired legal norms do not apply to them. This fact gives 
some idea of the fear of communists, and of reprisals 
generated after the 1965 'coup' and which has become a 
major political element, inextricably linked with the re-
pression which is the cornerstone of Indonesian politics. 
The generation and maintenance of this fear was tl1e 
final outcome of tensions which had developed from the 
early 19608 in an increasingly bitter polarisation of Indo-
nesian politics. In 1957, coinciding with serious regional 
rebellions, President Sukarno replaced parliamentary demo-
cracy with martial law. In 1959 .. Guided Democracy" was 
introduced, featuring an appointed legislature and a major 
increase in executive power. In this period from 1957, the 
Indonesian army which had played a decisive role in the 
independence struggle against the Dutch some ten years 
earlier, greatly expanded its influence in political and 
economic spheres, as some army officers became adminis-
trators, in many cases with few restrictions on their powers 
by the central government. At the same time the expansion 
of left-wing groups, especially the Indonesian Communist 
Party (henceforth PKI), provided a serious challenge to the 
military. Until October 1965, the leaders of the anny and 
the PKI maintained a tense and uneasy equihorium, 
precariously balanced by President Sukarno. The main areas 
of conflict were with the P.KI's criticism of the military's 
management of the economy, and then in 1964-5 the PK1 
supported unilateral attempts by the peasantry to occupy 
land in a bid to enforce the greatly delayed implementation 
of the 1960 Land Reform Law. At a time when P.JCT-
militazy relations were strained to breaking point, the party 
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proposed the establishment of a Fifth Force of armed 
peasants and workers to fight in the Confrontation with 
Malaysia. This later became a major issue in the political 
trials which followed the 'coup'. 
The 30 September Movement, G30S, or the 'coup' of 
1965 involved a number of middle ranking army officers, 
led by Lt-Col Untung, who were concerned about corrup-
tion, hlgh living and disloyalty in the higher ranks of the 
army. The plotters claimed that they had planned to kidnap 
the army leaders and to bring them to account before the 
president. In preceding weeks rumours had circulated in 
Indonesia that a "Council of Generals" was planning a 
coup early in October and tensions were high. For reasons 
which are still debated, six generals and another officer who 
were kidnapped were then killed on the night of September 
30th, some of them at the plotters' headquarters at Halim 
Air Force base near Jakarta and others during their capture. 
At the time people from PKI-affiliated youth and women's 
organisations were being trained at Halim as volunteers for 
the Confrontation with Malaysia. There are many accounts 
and interpretations of these events16 and strong evidence 
has been presented which suggests that the coup was 
Suharto's. A leading member of the G30S group, former-
Colonel Latief stated during his trial that Suharto knew 
about the G30S movement before the 'coup' occurred, and 
that in making no attempt to stop it he was deeply implica-
ted. He then committed acts of insubordination when he 
refused to allow General Pranoto who had been appointed 
by Sukarno as Caretaker Minister for Defence -to report to 
the president, and refused to stop the slaughter and 
excesses in the regions, although. Sukarno had ordered that 
bloodshed must stop.17 
In the confused period following the 'coup' the army led 
by Suharto quickly gained control, and with the upper 
hand was able to eliminate systematically and thoroughly 
its main rival for power, the PK.I, which at the same time 
became the scapegoat for the 'coup'. Offering very little 
resistance, hundreds of thousands of PKI members and 
sympatltisers, and many others with no PKI links, were 
horribly slaughtered in massacres which if not committed 
directly by the army were performed by intermediaries, 
often militant Muslim groups who were secure in their 
knowledge that they had unequivocal military backing. No 
assessment of contemporary Indonesian politics should 
overlook the scale of the killing. Amnesty International 
estimates, 
In the aftermath of the 1965 events, more than half a million 
were kiiled and about one million people arrested, interro-
gated and detained, 18 
In a lingering atmosphere of fear , the completeness of the 
military•s victory in physically removing the PKl, and the 
subsequent campaign of vilification has prevented lndo· 
nesian human rights advocates from campaigning around 
abuses which began with the installation of the Suharto 
government and the annihilation of the PKI. 
Why Trials? 
Considering the ferocity and unrestrained nature of the 
mass.acres, it seems reasonable to ask. why prisoners were 
tried at all. There is strong evidence that Aidit,19 Njoto20 
and probably Lukman and Sakirman, all key PKl figures, 
were executed after they had been arrested. Certainly 
these people would have been able to reveal to the courts 
more than anyone else, the extent of the undoubted links 
between some PKI leaders and the G30S officers. Ye.t to 
remove the PKI from the political scene and to efface its 
memory would have only represented a partial victory for 
the anny. The victory was made complete by the launching 
of a major propaganda campaign. Ideologically it has been 
necessacy to pro¥e that the PKI instigated the 'coup' and 
that it poses a continuing threat to the lndonesian people. 
It has thus been important to keep the memory of the PKI 
alive, and the trials have provided a way of doing so, 
repeating time and again the government doctrine of the 
'coup', while at the same time legitimising the victimisa· 
tion of the PIO. 
ln practical terms, in order to pave the way for the army 
to asswne p<>wer by way of the roles of protector of Presi-
dent Sukarno and the people, and as the restorer of security 
and order, it had to be shown that the PK.I was a menace, 
bent on the overthrow of the legal government. Immediate-
ly after the coup there were many lurid fabrications in the 
mass media. Photos of the decomposed bodies of the dead 
generals, which had been three days in a well at Lubang 
Buaya in the Halim base, were widely circulated. It was 
claimed that the generals had been castrated and that their 
eyes had been gouged out by communist women at Lubang 
Buaya. Shortly afterwards the dead generals and the dead 
officer were declared Heroes of the Revolution. Although 
doctors' postmortem reports discounted th.is story, the 
trials were used to propagate such theories and to force 
public opinion to accept them. The trials of individuals 
were in fact trials of the collective responsib11ity of the 
PKI so that the lndonesiarl people would never be able to 
protest or to question the victimisation and the terrible 
sacrifice of the PKI. 
ln the first decree which was issued with Suharto's sig-
nature the stories of the menace posed by the PK.I were 
reinforced, while the fate of the PKI was sealed through 
"legal" means. This Decree No . 1/3/1066 which banned the 
PKI was of crucial importance subsequently, especially in 
its retroactive use, and so it is reproduced in full below: 
Consideting 
1. That lately, a return of underground activities by remnants 
of forces of the counter-revolutionary September 30 Move-
ment/PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) have been 
increasingly felt , 
2. That those underground activities take the form of the 
spiead.Ulg of slander, instigations, rumow:s of divide and split, 
endeavourmg to aim tllemselves, which have caused the 
return of insecurity and disorder amongst the People: 
3. That those underground activities teally constitute a danger 
to the running of the Revolution in general, and disturb the 
consummation ot' the present stage of tht Revolution, es-
pecially in regard to finding a solution to econornic 
difficulties and the crushing of tho Necolim (&i.c) pioject of 
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Malaysia. 
4. That for the sake of keeping the oonsolidatlon, unity and 
integrity of the Indonesian progremve, revolutionary People 
and for the sake of the running of the Indonesian Revolution 
which is anti-feudalism, anti-capitalism, antl-Necolim (sic) 
and which· ia heading towards a prosperous society based on 
Panca Sila, an lndonesian Socialist Society, it is deemed 
neceswy 1o take S"-ift, precise and firm steps against the 
Pan11i Kommf1is lndone:da (The Indonesian Communist 
Party). 
Taking into C.OOsidention 
The results of interrogations and verdicts by the extraotdinary 
Military Tribunal passed on leaders of tlie September 30 Move-
ment/Partai Komuni3 Indonesia. 
In View of: 
The Order of the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Rorces of the Republic of Indonesia/Mandatoxy (sic) of the 
MPRS/Great Leader of the Revolution, on .Mazch 11, 1966. 
HAS RESOLVED 
Enacted: 
Wifll firmly remaining on the basis of the Five Talismans of the 
Revolution, 
Fiatly: 
To dissolve the Partai Komunis lndone:ria, including all parts of 
the organisation from the central level up to the tegions and all 
organisations of similar basis/patronised by it/affiliated to it. 
Secondly: 
DecLue the Partai Komunis Jndo11esil1 an outlawed Organisation 
throughout the territory, under the authority of the Republic of 
Indonesia. 
Thirdly: 
This decree comes into effect from the day of its promulgation.21 
A Propaganda Coup 
The defence lawyer in the first trial after the 'coup' that of 
the PKl leader~ Njon9, made it very clear that she was well 
aware of the propaganda value of the trials. The lawyer, 
Trees Sunito said, 
The extraordinary nature of this court22 does not give it the 
authority to depart from from the Law. What must be tried is a 
criminal case and not political opinions. What must be tried is an 
individual, not a (political) party. The notion of "r:ol/.ecticve 
schu!d'' (coll~tive guilt-trans) i& a primitive one which some-
times comes up as a retrogressive elem,.nt in the world of 
modern law . . . we must hold fumly to individual responsibility 
for actions in accordance with the Jaw in force, free from 
political evaluations . . . 
The inclination here and there towards the opinioru of "many 
people" or the "feelit1gs of the people throughout all comen e>f 
the country" is, in brief, what ls often described as 'opi-nbarc 
mening' (public opinion-tram). In this age of mass media, 
.. public opinion" is the opinion of those who control the mass 
media. And in this connection, I commend the politeness of the 
press-but I do not mean their onpartijdigheid (inpartiality-
trans.) because the press has already clearly anticipated the de--
cision of the judge in its publications-so just its politeness. 23 
A classic illustration ·or what Trees Sunito refers to is in the 
following exchange from the trial of Colonel Sudiono.24 
The prosecutor i~ questioning the witness. First Air 
Marshall Susanto: 
Pros: Whose actions undermined the good name of AURI (Indo-
nesian Air Force)? 
Susanto: It was the result of PKI infiltration into AURI. 
Pros: Who instigated the. infi1 tration? 
Sus.anto: Amongst others, the accu5ed Sudiono himself. 
Pros: How do you know this? 
Susanto: From the newspapers at the time of this Mahmillub 
(Extraordinary Militaey Tribunal). 
The feelings which the military thrust upon the Indo-
nesian people are cJearly outlined in a remarkable docu· 
ment entitled °Custodial Action Towards Fifteen Minis· 
ters'',25 Announcement of the President of the Republic 
of Indonesia, No. 5, dated 18 March 1966, and signed by 
Suharto on behalf of President Sukarno. Only a week 
before, Suharto had wrested effective executive power from 
Sukarno with the signing of a document known as SUPER-
SEMAR26 by President Sukarno. This document was 
later ratified to become known as an "Emergency Powers 
Act" and, 
.. . its executor was given broad powers to take whatever 
measures he may deem necessary in order to 1estore security and 
the rule of law in Indonesia. 27 
In fm<ling it necessary to arrest the ministers, who were all 
members of the (still in force) Sukarno government, 
Announcement No. 5, 18 March 1966 claimed to be pro· 
tecting Sukarno and the "stability of the process of govern-
ment". The ministers were all supposedly connected with 
the "counter-revolutionary adventure", the G30S, and the 
document states that the authorities in response to, 
... the innermost feelings of the people as set forth in various 
ways and also which have been presented in written form which 
basically reflect a consenJus of opinion, have been compelled 
to take custodial action, fox the purposes of ensuring that the 
said ministers should not become the victims of the peoples• 
uncontrollable anger, and of ensuring that the deep-felt demand$ 
of the people should not be disconnected with their good 
faith.28 
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Discrediting Sukarno 
The ensuing trials of Dr Subandrio, Jusuf Muda Dalam and 
Omar Dh3Jl} eased Suharto's assumption of power by dis-
crediting Sukarno "'by proxy".29 In this way it was sugges-
ted that Sukarno had become an unfit president since he 
had been influenced unduly by incompetent and corrupt 
advisors. The three trials were particularly successful in 
agitating the public, especially the students, so that the 
threat of still more bloodshed could then be used to force 
Sukarno's final capitulation, when he was forced publicly 
to implicate the PKI leaders in the 'coup' and ultimately to 
hand over complete power to Suharto. 
In the trial of Sukarno's Foreign Minister, Subandrio in 
October 1966, Sukarno was attacked for his domestic 
reliance on the PKI and for hh foreign policy which leant 
increasingly towards the Peoples' Republic of China. 
Subandrio was charged under the colonial criminal code 
(henceforth KUHP) in connection with the crime of 'econo-
mic subversion'.30 Under this rubric, it wa~ alleged that he 
had given other people, including D. N. Aidit the "means, 
opportunity or infonnation" to assist them to prepare a 
rebellion aimed at overthrowing the govermment. The 'sub-
versive' acts which subsequently condemned Subandrio to 
death31 included some of his actions as Foreign Minister 
and Deputy Prime Minister, and referred to his policy of 
buying am1s from China, his advice to Sukarno to halt 
repayment of debts to the Soviet Union, and his encourage-
ment of Indonesian withdrawal from the United Nations. 
Additionally it was alleged that he had spread rumours in 
order to incite people against the army, that he had fore-
knowledge of the coup, but had not tried to prevent it. 
The second charge stated that after the 'coup' he ha<l 
tried to undcnnine the-authority of the state. Although the 
"state" was still headed by Sukarno at the time, this is 
clearly a reference to the "state" wl1ich Suharto was 
rapidly pulling under his own control. Subandrio was 
accused of trying to minimise the significance of the 'coup' 
and of organising demonstrations in support of President 
Sukarno (who after all was still head of state) or in other 
words, opposed to those in support of Suharto. These 
charges were made under the Anti-Subversion Law, based 
on Presidential. Decree 11/1963 which carries the death 
penalty. The definition of "whose state?" was an issue 
which arose time and again in later trials. For example in 
the trial of Marsudi, the defence insisted that the charges 
were groundless because President Sukarno had never said 
that efforts had been made to undermine his state. Again, a 
former cabinet minister in the Sukarno government, Mr Oei 
Tju Tat stated in his defence plea on 3 March 1976 that he 
had always been known as a close ally of Sukarn·o, 
Who then would not be astoni!!hed and at the same time amused 
to hear that J, reputedly as a fellow-traveller of Sukarno, am 
accused of subversion against the Sukarno government of which 
I myself w.U a member! Is the purpose here to discredit Sukarno 
of whom l was a follower? This too is quite absuid. 32 
A month before the Subandrio trial, Jusuf Muda DaJam, 
the former minister for Central Banking Affairs was also 
sentenced to death on charges of subversion, corruption, 
illegally importing arms, nusmg financial support for 
Sukarno, and it was also mentioned that he had six wives, 
two more than allowed by Islamic law. He died in prison in 
1976 before the death sentence was executed. The trial of 
Omar Dhani the former Air Force Commander was clearly 
less concerned with establishing his personal involvement in 
G30S than with attempting to indict Sukarno. It was 
repeatedly suggested during the trial that Sukarno had 
known about the G30S, but that he had made no attempt 
to arrest its leaders. The Dhani trial may be seen as the 
beginning of the final stage of Sukarno's downfall. It com-
promised military supporters of Sukarno, prompted vocal 
demands from a.rmy-backed student groups for Sukarno's 
dismissal and trial, while the national associations of judges 
and lawyers in a joint statement entitled .. Declaration of 
Justice and Truth" and signed by the chainnen of both 
organisations, condemned Sukarno for his alleged support 
of G30S.33 Harold Crouch observes that one of the two 
signatories was Mashuri, Suharto's former next-door 
neighbour and close political advisor.34 
TI1e Anny Theory of the 'Coup' 
These three trials fulfilled specific propaganda functions 
while the remainder of the trials have served to promote the 
army theory of the 'coup' which has been presented tren-
chantly in the indictments, as well as by judges, prose-
cutors, witnesses and in government publications. In 
summary the army theory rests on the following dogma: 
* that the PKI had a long history of treachery towards the 
Republic, 
* that in 1965 army units under the influence of the PKI 
were incited to embark on actions which again im-
perilled the Republic 
* that PKI cadres and members of mass organisations tor-
tured and killed six generals and one other officer, 
* that these actions were part' of a PK I-orchestrated coup 
d'etat in which a Revolutionary Council was fonned and 
announced as a counter-government, 
* that the PKI had been preparing for this coup by infil-
trating the anned forces, the public service and the 
entire society so that its coup attempt wouJd be co-
ordinated throughout Indonesia, 
* that the PKI tried to deny its role in the coup and to 
shift the blame by claiming that the G30S was an inter-
nal army affair, 
* that the Sukarno government in hesitating over what 
action to take caused a breakdown in law and order 
which was then exploited by the PKI, causing mor~ 
unrest in the regions. 
A Major Thedrist 
Nowhere was this theory expounded more dearly than in 
the trial of the mysterious 'Sjam' or Kamaruzzaman. Not 
only was it ~tated in the indictments, in the prosecutor's 
and judge's remarks, but also by the accused himself who 
was exceptionally willing to discuss his role in the affai1, 
and through this, the guilt of the PKI. Although sentenced 
to deatl1, Sjam today is alive and well and reportedly has 
great freedom of action. He has always been a favoured 
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witness in G30S trials. Sjam has insisted that the so-called 
Biro Chusus (Special Bureau) headed by him, had formal 
status within the PK.I as the body fonning links between 
the PKI and the armed forces. Some surviving PKI members 
have professed· themselves bewildered by the revelations of 
the eXistence of thls veiy important PKI figure and his 
Special Bureau, which seemingly was very special and secret 
indeed. With Sjam and the Special Bureau being the only 
known link between the armed forces and the PKI, Sjam's 
roles as witness and accused have been pivotal in the trial 
propaganda. The Dutch writer, Coen Holtzappel quotes a 
«reliable source" as saying, 
Untung who hever trusted Sjam, had attempted several times to 
make e-nquirles about ms alleged contacts with the PKl Chail-
man. Sjam however :succeeded in preventing any direct contact 
between other membets of the Movement and Aidit3S 
Sjam obligingly 'confirmed' that Aidit had been alarmed by 
Sukarno's sudden illness in August 1965 and had feared 
that the armed forces would take advantage of his sudden 
death or incapacitation by organising a coup. Sjam has 
alleged that in an attempt to pre~mpt this, Aidit ordered 
rum to mobilise supporters in the armed forces to take 
action against the army leadership. 
Executive Management of the Trials 
the government would not have been able to present its 
case so forcefully had it not been able to control the courts 
to a considerable degree. In fact the evolution of the Indo-
nesian legal system since colonial times has allowed the 
executive to rein in the courts under its own jurisdiction. 
There has .in fact been a Long struggle in Indonesia in order 
to bring about basic legal and political change by allowing 
the judiciary more independence with.in the state structure 
and thus imposing limits on executive power,36 
For centuries Indonesia has been a state where bureau-
cratic power is paramount because the bureaucracy has 
been the locus of political and economic power. Now the 
Indonesian bureaucracy may be considered as an armed one 
as for two decades the military has taken over more and 
more bureaucratic functions. Titls leaves a rather weakened 
middle class without a strong property base, whereas in 
Europe it was the clamouring of the propertied middle 
classes for an impartial judiciary to protect basic rights 
and contracts which led to the separation of powers held 
dear .in the west. In Indonesia those who wish. to see an 
independent judiciary tend to be rule of law and civil 
rights advocates who do not have the push of property 
rights behirid them, and hence the main challenge they 
present to the New Order is a political one. 
In the short-lived period of Sukarno's parliamentary 
democracy the separation of powers (trlas politicas) was 
preserved, but in 1964 Sukarno dealt this a devastating 
blow with the promulgation of Law 19/1964. Article 19 of 
this law gave the president the power "In certain matters to 
intervene in the affairs of the judiciaiy". Yet in the 1945 
Constitution to which Indonesia returned by Presidential 
Decree of 5th July 1959, articles 24 and 25 state in their 
explanatory notes that the Judiciary acts as an independent 
power free from executive influence. Although n;iany h~ve 
argued that Law 19/1964 was unconstitutional, 1t remains 
in practice as the judiciary is still subjugated to the 
executive. 
The Ministly of Justice has executive control of the 
lower courts, and judges are civil servants. So too are the 
prosecutors while the advocates (defence lawyers) are some-
thing of political pariahs outside of the legal-administrative 
circles of authority. With the coincidence of political, legal 
and bureaucratic power, the loyalties of the judges might be 
expected to be with those in power. A predictable attitude 
was displayed during the trial of Asep Suryaman, when the 
prosecutor, J. F. Mambu said, 
, .• the side rep.resenting the state must be respected ... whereas 
the defence counsel merely repretents the defendant alone.37 
One defence lawyer, Ad.nan Buyung Nasution has shown 
compass.ion for the situation of the state-controlled judges, 
•.• they cry in their heatts because they ate forced to make 
decisions which conflict with their beliefs of the values of truth 
and justice. 38 
The effects of the questionable impartiality of Indo-
nesian judges are even greater than suggested above as 
judges play a very active role in court processes. This issue 
has been raised in a recent debate in Indonesia centring 
about a proposed new bill, aimed at replacing the 130-year-
old Revised Procedural Code (HIR-Herzien Jnllll1dsch 
Reglement). The H1R allows for the active participation of 
the judge in examining the accused and witnesses. Tempo39 
comments that for the defence lawyer, 
... the real opponent is not the prosecutor but 1he judge-who 
controls the rules of the game. 
In many trials which followed the 'coup' the defendants 
were bullied and wearied by relentless questioning by the 
judges, and it was made clear that an <unco-operative, atti-
tude would be penalised. 
Early in his presidency, when Suharto made much of the 
claim that he would be the champion of rule of law and 
freedom of expression, lawyers and judges were greatly 
encouraged by these signs. ln this atmosphere, pressures 
grew to rescind Law 19/1964 and some other disputed 
laws. The main issues involved in the demands were the 
independence of the judiciary and the powers of judicial 
review ovet legislation. T11e issue of judicial independence 
was a highly charged one as it made a fundamental 
challenge to the structure of state power. The government 
resisted, and Suharto 
. .. insisted that as the executive was no longer interfering in 
the wotk of the courts, judicial independence was no lruiger 
really a problem.40 
But during the debate, the former Minister for Justice, 
Oemar Seno Adji (now Chairperson of the Supreme Court), 
stated. 
... that the judiciary was no less in need of control than 1he 
executive and that a rigid concept of separation of the powers 
8 TAPOL But1etin No 37 January 1980 
was less productive than one of institutional co-operation.41 
Eventually when Law 14/1970, the Basic Law on the 
Judiciary was promulgated it reconfirmed the independence 
of the judiciary and in article 4 para 3 eliminated article 19 
of Law 19/1964. The explanatory note for article 4 para 3 
states: 
It should be made quite clear that in order that the courts may 
perform their function in the best possible way, that is to say, to 
pass down verdicts that are solely based upon truth, justice nnd 
honesty, it is not permissible for any pressure 01 influences to be 
exerted from outside which would render the judges unfree in 
passing down verdicts. 
That the provisions of Law 14/1970 are not enforced is 
clear in the following pages. The Law gives some guarantees 
to prisoners, for example the presumption of innocence 
(article 6), compensation for illegal arrest and prosecution 
(article 9), the right to counsel (article 35), but all these 
good intentions, including the independence of the 
judiciary cannot be enforced as the ancillary legislation for 
the implementation of Law l 4/ 1970 has simply not been 
forthcoming. In fact it is difficult to sec that Law 14/1970 
can be treated even as a "statement of national intention", 
as Damian and Hornick said in I 972.42 Nonetheless the 
authorities do seem to be making some statements about 
who is allowed to be in favour of trios po/ideas (separation 
of powers). Before pronouncing the death sentence in the 
case of Asep Suryaman, the judge noted that Asep's 
defence lawyers had talked about trias politicas, but 
asserted that Asep, as a communist could not possibly be in 
favour of trias politiais. 43 
The trial of Asep perhaps best illustrates the difficulties 
of defence lawyers when they confront the courtroom. A 
long quotation follows from the eksepsi44 delivered by the 
defence lawyer, Mr Yap Thiam Hien during this trial on 5 
July 1975. Asep was a PKI activist who was charged with 
subversion. In his defence Mr Yap made a courageous 
attack on the entire structure of laws and 'legal' practice 
which have been used to arrest and detain the G30S 
prisoners. In doing so he attacked state power itself and 
institutionalised legal corruption , knowingly running the 
risk of being arrested himself for contempt of court. He was 
also aware that his stand would not be wide1y publicised in 
Indonesia, and indeed this was borne out in the press 
reports of the trial in July-August 1975. He stated, 
May I invite you Honoured Chairman and respected member~ 
of the Court, to look objectively at the legal set·up in the 
New Order so that we may together try to draw the correct 
conclusions. What i~ the status of the Judiciarl'· in the present 
legal set-up? To consider this matter in its proper proportions 
and dimensions, I would like to taise tlte follow.ing: 
1. Aiticle 11 of Law 14/1970 states: 
Organs entrusted to implement the law under paragraph 1, 
Aiticle 10-the spheres of court operations-organisational, 
administrauve and financial-fall within the competeflce of the 
respective gC>vetnment departments. In other words, -with the 
exception of the Supreme Court, the Powers of the Judiciary fall 
within the competence of the Department of Justice organisa· 
tionally, admumtxatively and financially. The Department of 
Justice h the executive authority which regulates such matters 
as waties, promotions and transfers etc. 
2. Article 31 of Law 14/1970 stipulates that judges are appoin· 
ted and d"ismissed by the Prcslden t as Head of Government. 
3. The Basic Law on Government Employees contains amongst 
othet things, administrative sanctions against government 
employees., Including judges, who deviate. (This can include 
t.tamfer, postponment of a salary rise, or a reduction in salal:y or 
status-see article 20). 
4. Presidential Decision No. 82, 1971 regarding KORPRI (Civil 
Servant Corps of Republic of Indoncsia-trlllls.) states that all 
officials of the Republic of Indonesia fall within une repository 
headed by the ~finister for the Interior, that is to say, they are 
part of the Executive Authority. 
5. SUPERSEMAR which has now been repealed as it has been 
replaced and rai~ed to the level of an MPRS 1Jecision45j(TAP 
No. IX/ MPRS/1966). 
6. MPRS, TAP No. XV/Ml'RS/1966 on the dissolution and prn-
hibition of the Indonesian Communist Party and the teaching 
and dissemination of Marxism and Commun.ism. 
8. The resolve adopted by the military commanders of Java on 
7 July 1967. 
9. The extraordinary powers of the Attorney General, conferred 
on hin1 by virtue of Law No. 15, 1969 (previously Presidential 
Decision No. 11, 1966). 
10. Last but not least, Presidential Decision No. 19, 1969 re-
garding tlte formation of KOPKAMTIB {Operational Command 
fox the Restoration of Security and Order) as further revised in 
1974. 
MI Chairman and respected Members of the Court, 
All the MPRS Decisions, the laws, and Presidential Decisions 
mentioned above show on the one hand that organisationally, 
structurally, administratively and Onanc:iall:y, the Powers of the 
Judiciaiy fall within the competence of the Executive Powers, 
and In fact incorporate sanctions against those who deviate. On 
the other hand there are regulations and laws that proclaim the 
PKI (Indonelian Communist Party) and organisations affiliated 
to it as being prohibited parties and organisations. These regula-
tions incorporate instructions for the restoration of law and 
order from the instabilities resulting f!om PKJ incidents, and 
issue instructions for the uprooting of all teaching or spreading 
of communism. Those who teach, study or spread Marxism· 
Communism are of course people. 
Now I am not an advocate or follower of Marxism-Communism, 
neither am I a sympathiser or fellow-traveller of communists. 
Nevertheless in my opinion, the order to uproot Marxist· 
Communists who are our fellow citizens also applies to the 
colll'ts which have to apply the Law. It is indeed a fact that not 
a few Indonesian Communists have been uprooted either accor· 
ding to legal procedures, or without "due procesg of the law". 
My question is: within the present legal set-up In which the 
Executive exerts such great Influence over the Judiciary, b it 
possible In the case of per~ons charged with Marxism-Commu-
nism or with invol\'ement in the 30th Septembet 1965 affair, for 
the Judiciary to be able to, and to have the courage to carry out 
the trial freely , truthfully, justly and objectively and without 
prejudice as is required of them in the Constitution and Law No. 
14/1970? 
In reply to Mr Yap's statement, the Chairman of the panel 
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of judges, Abdullah, said that he "promised to be honest 
in this case".46 But he also cautioned the defence lawyer, 
saying that if the court was to presume the innocence of 
the defendant, then the defence should presume the impar-
tiality of the court!47 
The · control of the Ministry of Justice over the court 
structure has been a recurring theme in another way as well. 
In many eksepsis, the manner in which state courts have 
been constituted has been disputed. It is argued that every 
state court must be set up according to the law, but pointed 
out that the Central Jakarta State Court is illegal as it was 
only set up on the basis of a Decision by the Ministry of 
Justice . 
The Military Courts 
Of the 366 cases of trials for which there is some infonna-
tion, 207 were tried in military courts. At least 28 of these 
were tried in the Mahmillub (Extraordinary Military 
Tribunal). The Mahmillub is aptly named for it does indeed 
have extraordinary powers. It has tried civilian as well as 
military cases, as the government has explained that the 
Mahmillub 
... did not restrict itself to trying military personnel, for to do 
so would be to accept the 'September 30 Movement' as 'an inter-
nal army affair' whUh (sic) had been the aim of the PKL 48 
The Mahmillub was established by Presidential. Decree 
No. 16 in 1963, but as far as can be determined. only two 
cases, those of Ibnu Hadjar and Dr Somoukil, both of 
whom were tried for anned rebellion, were trted in 
Sukarno's time. In setting up the Mahmillub. Sukarno 
invoked Presidential Decision No . 226, 1963 which gave 
him the highest authority to take special measures against 
threats to security. The Decree stated that there were still 
threats to the Indonesian Revolution and that it was 
necessary to create a special. court apparatus to deal with 
these threats quickly. Since the cases were concerned with 
security and defence, it was considered necessary to set up 
the Mahmillub within the framework of military courts. 
This court was domiciled in Jakarta but could sit outside 
the place of domicile. 
The President himself was to decide which cases would 
be tried in theMahmiltub (article 1), and would appoint the 
Presiding Judge, two or more member judges, one Oditur 
(Prosecutor) and a clerk (article 3). Other indications of 
the truly extraordinary and unconstitutional nature of this 
court are in: 
Article 6 (I) 
Before being announced and implemented, the Decision 
of the Tribunal must first be submitted to the Minister/ 
Commander of the force who submitted the case upon 
which a verdict bas been taken, in order to obtain 
approval for its implementation. 
Article 7 ( 1) 
Implementation of a verdict of the Tribunal which does 
not involve the death penalty shall not be delayed by an 
appeal for clemency. 
Article 7 (2) 
If a death sentence is passed, the implementation can 
only be carried out after the President has taken a de-
cision concerning the matter of clemency in the case 
concerned. 
On December J 965, Suharto obtained the signature of 
Sukarno to Pres.idential Decision No. 370/1965. At the 
time he signed this document, Sukarno was already under 
considerable pressure. The Decision considered in Article 
3 that 
• .. the so-called '30th September Movement is a counter· 
revolu tionar)' adventure, 
which was a threat to t11e Indonesian Revolution as it was 
nearing "its decisive stage". 
It was decided to use the Mahmll/ub to try those cases 
which needed to be "quickly resolvcd .. ,49 and the Decision 
determined 
To give authority to Major-General TNl Suharto, 01 some 
High Officer appointed by him: 
(a) to dcte1mine who among the persons referred to in the first 
article above shall be tried, 
(b) to act as Officer Submitting Cases in the above-mentio.ned 
cases, 
(c) to determine the compmition of the Extraordinary Military 
Tribunal to prepare, examine and try the above-mentioned cases. 
In many eskepsis it was argued that the Mahmil/ub did not 
have the legal authority to try the cases, since it was not 
legally constituted. To give one example, the defence 
lawyer, Mr Y11.p Thiam Hien raised the following points at 
the trial of Dr Suba.ndrio. He recalled that the 1945 
Constitution stipulates that the powers and procedures of 
judicial bodies must be executed in accordance with the law 
(Law 19/1964, article 8 para 3). Like state courts, military 
courts in Indonesia are also regulated by law (Law 29/ 
1954, article 35, para 2) and it is stipulated that the 
Military Supreme Court and the High Military Tribunal are 
second level courts, ie. that they must allow the right of 
appeal (Law 6/1950, article 9). This right is emphatically 
denied by the Mahmi/lub. 
The powers given to the Mahmillub to try G30S cases 
were given by way of a Presidential Decision, which legally 
should not conflict with existing laws or the constitution. 
Mr Yap also pointed out in the Subandrio trial that Pres!· 
dential. Decision No. 370/1965 conflicts with the Presi-
dential Decree setting up the Mahmillub (which arguably 
is also invalid), which gave special powers to the President 
of the Republic of Indonesia to determine which cases shall 
be tried by the Malimillub, but it clearly gives no authority 
to the President to delegate these powers. Yet in Presiden-
tial Decision 3 70/196 5, sub 2, the President delegated his 
powers to decide who should detennine which persons 
would be tried in the Mahmillub to General Suharto who 
then by way of Decision 1/KOPKAM/12, 1965, further 
delegated these powers to seven senior officials. 
High military courts (Mahmfln) are used to try those 
from the rank of major upwards and they serve major 
defence areas, that is larger than divisional commands. The 
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Divisional Military Courts (Mahmildam) tzy those below 
the rank of major and they represent a divisional conunand 
which covers an area equivalent to a province. The Regional 
Military Courts (Mahmilrem) also try those below the rank 
of major, and represent a sub-divisional command. In 
addition are the Air Force Courts (Mahmilau), the Navy 
Court (Mahmilal), the Marines Court (Mahmiimar) and the 
Police Court (Mahakda). 
Many civilians objected to being tried in military courts. 
Sudisman for example, raised the matter in his eksepsi and 
added that the military court could not be expected to be 
impartial and noted that there were discernible elements of 
revenge in military trials. Latief complained too that he 
was being tried as a civilian, in a military court (Mahmilti) 
although he had not received a notice of dismissal from the 
army.SO He also protested that the Prosecutor in his case 
was lower ranking than he. Again the counsel for another 
prisoner, ex-Brigadie~·General Sawamo from the Police 
Force, who was tried in the Mahmilti, stated that the court 
had no competence to try the defendant and that he should 
be tried in a police court. 
The civilian district courts (Pengadilan Negen) are civil 
courts of the first resort. Appeal procedure is permitted 
and most convicted G30S prisoners have given notice of 
appeal, although appeal courts function extremely slowly. 
When appeals have been heard the higher court has either 
upheld or increased sentence. Under Indonesian Law, the 
prosecution may also appeal agains1 sentence. 
Arrest and Detention 
All the political prisoners who have been brought to trial 
have been KOPKAMTIB detalnees, although KOPK.AM-
TIB has no legal status as a detaining agency. Tempo51 
has discus11ed this issue and the continuing powers of KOP-
KAMTIB which detains people with or without trial on the 
basis of Presidential Decree 11 /1963 on Anti-Subversion. 
In this case a person may be held - for up to one year 
without trial, after which time it can be prolonged. Some 
effort has been made to regularise KOPKAMTIB powers 
of detention which in fact have now been decreed 'judicial'. 
That KOPKAMTIB's powen of anest and detention are 
outside the judicial framework was recognised in 1977 in a 
Supreme Court Circular which acknowledged that there 
were two types of detention, the first described as "judicial 
or repressive,. detention and the second exercised by KOP-
KAMTlB being described as .. for security and order". The 
Circular recommended that since KOPKAMTIB's powers of 
detention were not judicial, the pre-trial period of deten-
tion should not be taken into account when the prisoners 
came to trial. The later move to declare KOP.KAMTIB's 
powers as 1udiciar, although it has some merit in trying to 
assure that 'the pre-trial period will be deducted from final 
sentence, is ultimately retrogressive, for in fact judicial 
recognitio11 is to be accorded to something which .lies 
outside of the Illle of law. On 27th November 1978 KOP-
KAMTIB issued an instruction in which it declared itself to 
be the sole arbiter in detennining the processes of arrest, 
detention and interrogation.52 The statement was issued in 
response to growing concern about the delayed implemen· 
tation of Law 14/1970, the Basic Law on the Judiciary, and 
yet the Instruction seriously erodes the safeguards upheld 
in the Law. For example the Instruction states that instead 
of the accused having legal advice from the time of arrest , 
he or she may only take advantage of this before or after 
preliminary interrogation. During this interrogation a legal 
advisor is not allowed to be present, while any discussion 
between the prisoner and his/her legal advisor must be 
witnessed by the investigating official, and the prisoner is 
only allowed to discuss f arnily matters and matters relating 
to arrest and detention. The case itself may not be dis" 
cussed. While the 1970 Law states that legal advice for the 
prisoner is a right, the KOPKAMTIB Instruction merely 
states that the accused may obtain this advice. After the 
Instruction was issued KOPKAMTIB closed all discussion of 
the matter. 
In the trial of Asep Suryaman the defence lawyer, Mr 
Yap Thiam Hien, protested that the Prosecutor had not pre-
sented the court with valid detention documents. The 
Prosecutor justified this, saying that Asep had been arrested 
in 1965, but had then escaped and had not been re-arrested 
until 1971. He added that, if the defendant had been in 
prison for many years without documents, it was in order 
to safeguard the security of the state.53 Yap still insisted 
that documents validating the second arrest must be sub-
mitted, and in this case he was not merely quibbling over 
legal procedures, but was questioning the constitutional 
basis for Asep's arrest, and indeed those of hundreds of 
thousands of others, and in fact was launching a direct 
attack on the continuing powers of KOPKAMTIB. The 
basis of KOPKAMTIB arrests and detention is usually 
affiliation or sympathy with the PKJ which was dissolved 
and outlawed by Presidential Decree 1/3/1966 (later rati-
fied as MPRS Ordinance XXV/MPRS/1966), which 
dissolved the PKI, declared it a forbidden party and forbade 
the dissemination of communist teachings. KOPKAMTIB 
has been using this Decree retroactively and thus illegally, 
but in any case the Decree and the Ordinance are in conflict 
with the 1945 Constitution which guarantees freedom of 
assembly, association and speech. Mr Yap recalled article 
26 during the Asep Suryaman trial, but the court 
denounced this defence as a 
..• dangeroua submission, as strengthening the oommunist cause 
and a.s not in accord with tlw code of ethics of the advocates' 
profession ... 54 
Furthermore Decree No. 1/3/1966 was not signed by 
Sukarno although he was still President. Suharto has simply 
assumed that SUPERSEMAR authorised him to issue 
instructions on the President's behalf. 
The extremely unpredictable process of arrest by 
KOPKAMTIB has been described by an informed writer, 
Inevitably, in a situation where arrests are so arbitnuily set in 
motion, many people now being held as political detainees have 
no political past whatsoever, but have been victimised as relatives 
or friendl of persons being sought by the army; they include 
people who have been unable to prove their identity to the 
arresting unit, who have been persecuted as a result of personal 
difficulties with neigh.bows or co-workers, or for a host of 
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equally futile reasons. SS 
During KOPKAMTIB detention political prisoners have 
often been subjected to ''preliminary interrogation". 
Following trus 'they have been made to sign statements from 
the intenogation which have then been used as evidence in 
the trials. Other arrests were then made on the basis of 
these statements. M~y witnesses testified in trials that 
torture, compulsion and trickery were used in order to ex-
tract their confessions. In his trial Njono complained of an 
atmosphere of "communist phobia" at ms preliminary in-
terrogation56 while the witness Mohammad bin J acub 
stated that he had been struck.57 A reliable source has 
described how he was interrogated while being made to 
listen to another prisoner screaming terribly while being 
subjected to electrical torture.SS Again CoJonel latiefS9 
was interrogated while he was in an extremely poor 
physical condition. He had been very ill and semi-conscious 
for some time as he describes in h.is defence plea,60 but this 
did not interfere with the process of his questioning, and in 
fact on one occasion he was carried into interrogation on a 
stretcher. Latief had been stabbed and shot during his 
arrest. He also catalogues how others were subjected to 
torture during interrogation. One man had been handcuffed 
for a whole year, subjected to electrical torture and struck 
with heavy objects while unconscious until his whole body 
was covered with blood. He said that many people were 
subjected to psychological and physical torture and that 
many had become mad, blind or impotent. Some were 
chained and 
.. . tortured with blows from heavy instruments, wooden chain, 
plastic piping, whipt with sharp lashes, and tlle tail of the pari 
fish (stingray-trans.) ... fingers were squashed by table legs, 
nails we.re removed, 'fingers smashed and arms broken. 61 
At his own trial Sudisman commented wryly, 
The results of torture during preliminary interrogations on my 
Party comrades could be observed immediately they appeared 
as witnesses before tlte court. 1 don't of course deny the stat~ 
ment of the doctor who announced that Mr Sardjono had an 
attack of the 'flu>,62 
Amnesty International also reports the widespread use 
of torture. In the years following 1965, torture was syste-
matically used as an everyday occurrence in interrogation: 
Youns girls below the age of thirteen, old men. people who 
were frail and ill, were not exempt from tortu.ce. It was used 
not only Cot interrogation, but also for punishment, and with 
sadistic intent C.ases of sexual assault on women and extreme 
cmelty were reported to AmnestY International Deaths from 
torture were frequently reported up till the end of the 1960s. At 
the present time, Amnesty International receives reports of c~s 
of torture under intenogation. The worst cues are those of mili-
tMY officers and men suspected of left-wing tendencies, who are 
tortured by their fellow-officera. ·me Air Force interrogation 
centre in Jakarta is particularly notorious for its use or brutal 
and prolonged torture.63 
In the trial of Asep Suryaman, Mr Yap Thiam Hien as 
defence counsel asked a witness, MartosuwacU how his 
interrogation report had actually been drawn up. At this 
point the judge intervened and ordered the witness not to 
answer.64 
Access to Defence Lawyers . 
Although it is guaranteed by law, it is very difficult for 
prisoners to gain access to lawyers. The court reserves the 
right to veto a defence appointment and thus can and 
almost always does, delay the appointment of the defence 
until immediately before the trial, so that the defence has 
no time to prepare a case . To give two instances one 
defence lawyer was asked two days before a case and on the 
following day was taken to see the defendant, but was not 
allowed to see him alone. Jn this case the defendant had to 
write his defence plea in a cell which had no desk or chair, 
and although the lawyer requested better conditions for the 
defendant and more writing paper, this was denied.65 
Another l~wyer has described how the defendant was given 
a copy of the charges against him only three days before 
the trial was due to commence, and it was only on the day 
the trial began that the defence counsel was allowed to 
meet the defendant, and then only in the presence of 
soldiers and police. The Prosecutor had ordered his subor· 
dinates to stay within earshot during this meeting. The 
defence counsel then only had three days after the charges 
were read to look up a myriad of laws and to prepare the 
case.66 
The Laws 
In his defence plea, Sudisman summed up tlte legal irony 
of his situation when he objected to the use of colonial 
laws in his trial for subversion against the state of 
lndonesia67 
As a communist and as a son of Indonesia. I fed ashamed that in 
the Dutch period before World War ll, I wu arrested by the 
Dutch oolonial government for persdelict (offence against the 
press laws-trans.) and ·was charged with violating articles in 
Engelbrecht {the compendium of colonial law-trans.); that in 
the Dutch period after World Wu II, I was agam arrested by the 
Dutch colonial. government and charged with violating articles of 
Engelbrechr; and that after almost 22 yem of Indonesian inde.-
pendence I am once again accused of violating ar1icles of J::ngel-
brecht .• . Frankly I cannot accept that the words des KD71ings 
can be read as "of the Pruident,. since we do not live in a 
Koningkrijk (Kingdom} but in the Republic of Indonesia which I 
love. I also cannot agree witll the words 'ministeriale veran f· 
woordelfjkheid' (ministerial responsi'billty), in tltis instance of 
the Dutch government being identified with the Cabinet of the 
Republic of Indonesia, because their spirit is utterly different 
On the other hand if the Honourable Prosecutru is willing to 
equate the Staten·Generaal with the present MPRS which ls not 
elected by the People, that is up to him. 
Several articles in the colonial Criminal Code, the KUHP, 
relating to participation in criminal acts (articles 55 and 56) 
crimes against state security (articles 106, 107, l 08 and 
110) and crimes against persons-or murder (article 340) 
have been used consistently in G30S cases. With the excep· 
tion of article 340 which was only used for those con· 
sidercd directly responsible for the deaths of the generals, 
none of the articles carry the death penalty. In order to 
secure the death penalty, two anti-subversion laws, Penpres 
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5/1959 and :Pcnpres 11/1963, have been used in conjunc-
tion with the KUHP articles. This practice of combining the 
KUHP with the all-embracing Anti-Subversion laws was 
strongly protested by Mr F. C. Tjam, the defence counsel in 
the trial of Supardjo, 
Suppose we decide on {KUHP) article 134 in wnnection with 
Penpres (Presidential Decision-trans.) No. 5/1959, especially 
article 2, then we are confronted with $Omething which I am 
almost sure will not be accepted by the voice of the innermost 
soul of the Indonesian people. I read article 134, "Deliberate 
insult to the President or Vice-President is punishable with a. sen-
tence of as much as six years or a fine of 3 00 rupiah. This is in 
an article of the KUHP. But if used with article 2 of Penpres No. 
5/1959, then the accused is suspected of giving a deliberate 
insult and mjght be sentenced to death. 
The first anti-subversion law, the Economic Subversion 
Decree or Penpres 5/1959, involves "an increase in the 
severity of sentence against criminal acts which endanger 
the provision of basic needs .(food and clothing)". In the 
broad definition of this decree, acts which endanger the 
••organising of the security of the people and of the state" 
and those which interfere with the anti-imperialist struggle, 
(w:ith special reference to West Irian) are liable to the death 
penalty. In many of the G30S trials charges were made on 
the basis of the second decree, the Presidential Decree on 
Subversion, No. 11/1963, which also made subversion a 
capital offence. The decree only became law in 1969, but 
was used regardless before 1969. It has provided a far-
reaching and draconian measure to the Sukarno, and es-
pecially the Suharto governments as a means of suppressing 
all political opposition. Mr Yap Thiam Hien has described 
the act as a .. rubber law"68 and elsewhere commented, 
You know, the Anti-Subversion act is so wide and its interpre>-
tation so broad that everybody can be affected. Some people 
even say that bteathing is subversive,69 
The application of these laws has made the job of the 
prosecution very easy as it has hardly been necessary to 
draw up a detailed case for th~ prose~u(i_on. Latief objected 
to the use of Penpres 5/1959 in his case, saying that it gave 
the prosecutor the punishment .. in his pocket". He a}SQ 
observes that the law was supposed to protect Sukarno and 
points out the irony of his case, saying that if the Prose-
cutor chose to prosecute him on the basis of Penprcs 
5/1959, then it meant that he sided with Sukarno in which 
case he should join Latief in prison. Or if Latief did break 
this law, then that is what Suharto did, and in this case 
Latief should be given a medaI.70 Njono was tried under 
Pcnpres 5/1959. He had stated that in the undertaking of 
his duties at the time of the 'coup' he was to see that trans-
port was not disrupted. Somehow the court turned this 
against him and thus proved that he was guilty of economic 
subversion. The reasoning went as follows,71 
The accused could guess previously that the G30S would create 
economic difficulties, because the accused said prcvfously 
amongst other things, that through the workers' federation with 
whom he was connected, land and a.it traffic could continue as 
usual. 
Furthermore it was necessary to pmve Njono guilty 
under the l<UHP articles 107, 108 and 110 in order to 
obtain sentence on the basis of the economic subversion 
charge connected with them . The proof all depended on the 
decision setting up the Mahmillub for the CJOS trials, 
which was signed by Sukarno and which denounced the 
G30S as a "counter-revolutionary adventure". From here 
the Prosecutor was able to extrapolate 
The term counter-revolutionary is in essence a political term, not 
a legal term in the sense of juridical terminology, but the term is 
certainly a term which i~ used in the legal terminology of the 
revolution, the highest law of the pe-0ple and the state which is 
in revolution. 72 
Jn his eksepsi Sudisman's counsel argues that the KUHP 
articles 107, 108 and 110 are centuries old and promul-
gated to protect the Dutch Indies government. He observes 
that there are no specific laws on "counter-revolutionary 
crimes" since Penpres 11/1963 and Penpres 5/1959 are 
unconstitutional and unlawful. He quotes a legal adage, 
Geen strafbaar /'cir zonder voorafgna11de straf/JepaUng (nu/la 
puna rina praevia lage punali) 
-or that there ca11 be no offence without prior penal 
provision. 
In February 1975 four womf1ri whn were leading 
members of women's trade union and peasant Jroups, 
were tried under the Anti-Subversion Act.73 Their •subver-
sive' activities indu<led obtaining false identity cards, 
publishing and distributing illegal bulleti.1s and providing 
assistance to the children of political prisoners. One of the 
women, Sulami, was also accused of having recruited 
women to go to Lubang Buaya to help with cooking and 
sewing, which proved to the prosecutor that she had known 
about the 'coup'. The women received 20, 18, 15 and 15 
years' sentences. Jn another subversion case, two women 
and a man were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for 
circulating illegal pamphlets in West Kalimantan. The 
defence counsel argued that one of the accused Mariam 
bin ti Kadi was mentally abnormal and asked that she be 
examined by a psychiatrist. The judge rejected the request 
saying that his experience in court had shown that defen-
dants were always trying to pervert the course of justice 
and would go as far as feigning disability in order to receive 
a lower sentence. The court, he said, was in a position to 
judge which of her statements were true and which were 
false.74 
Mr Oei Tju Tat was charged under the anti-subversion 
act some ten years after his arrest. It was alleged that as a 
leading member of Partindo?S he had issued a statement 
that had claimed that the G30S was nn 'internal anny 
affair' and that with this statement Mr Oei had tried to 
undermine or destroy ihe government. It was shown con-
clusively in court that Mr Oei was not personally respon-
sible for the statement, and that indeed he had protested 
against it. Nonetheless he was sentenced to 13 years' im-
prisonment with deduction for the time already served. 
After the sentence had been handed down, the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists commented 
. 
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The court'5 attempted justification of this extraordinary judg~ 
ment was that Mr Oei •did not react strongly enough, although 
protesting against the statement'. This shameful decision can be 
explained only by factors external to the trial itself, and as an 
atte~t to justify Mr Oei's detention for almost ten years before 
trial 7fi 
Rule of Law advocates who seek the revoking of the anti-
subversion laws run the risk of being branded as subver.sives 
themselves. A recent editorial in the army newspaper Berita 
Yudha77 stated that those who wish to secure basic human 
rights over the interests of the state aimed at .. belittling the 
urgency of national security". Many lesser crimes than this 
have been labelled •subversive' and punished accordingly. 
Witne~s 
While the prosecution evidence given in the trials has been 
almost invariably flimsy, fabricated or coerced, witnesses 
a decharge {defence witnesses) have seldom been allowed to 
appear. Latief complained bitterly in his defence plea that 
he had been unable to call a single witness. His witnesses 
a decharge included President and Mrs Suharto, as well as 
foreign journalists who had interviewed Suharto about a 
meeting on the night of the 'coup' at which Latief had 
informed Suharto of the plans of middle-ranking anny 
officers to bring the army leadership to account. Latief 
also wanted to call as a witness Pono, who seems to have 
been a key figure in the 'coup', but the court refused for 
"technical reasons". Latief protested and said that other 
witnesses had been brought from Cipinang prison, where 
Pono was being held, and that there were no security 
reasons why he should not be brought, in fact no valid 
reason at all. The· court insisted that written testimony 
signed by Pono was sufficient, but Latief observed that in 
1972 he had testified at Pono's trial and Pono had accepted 
his testimony as correct. Yet Pono's written testimony 
presented at Latiers trial was in conflict with Latiefs evi-
dence given in 1972, and had in fact been drawn up in 
1971, but not signed until 1973 . As a last resort, Latief 
asked whether his 1972 testimony could be read out in 
court, but this too was refused.78 
In one case where defence witnesses were "allowed", 
the cynicism of the court was apparent. During the trial of 
Iskandcr Subekti, Kompas reported, 79 
On the request of the accused, Iskander Subekti the team of 
judges at the Jakarta State Court which is examin'i.ng and trying 
the subversion case, yesterday , Thursday, agreed to produce 
Aidit and Sudisman as witnesses a declw:ge .. . The prosecutor 
in yesterdlly's session said that he asked for one day to bY and 
present them. As known, at the end of 1967, Sudisman was 
sentenced to death by tlte Mahmf/lub, while Aidit was reported 
as shot dead in a mop-up operation. 
Written evidence from witnesses has been corrunonly 
used. Often the evidence is a signed interrogation report, 
and many of the witnesses are themselves under sentence of 
death, and not knowing if or when it will be carried out. 
Following a train crash in Java, the railway workers Radi 
and Kirtam, were tried with committing sabotage in August 
1975. In their trial, the most spurious written 'defence' 
evidence was accepted by the court as proving their guilt 
Kompas reported,80 
Written testimonies were heard in the session from four wit-
nesses a decharge. The four were PKI figures, ToWidjari, 
Mustakim, Yatim and Asep Suryaman, alias Hamin. The evidence 
was used in an effort to reveal the disguised tactical and political 
connections with PK.I, especially SBKA 81 in connection with 
the collision in Telama. Witnesses Mustakirn and Asep Su.ryarnan 
spoke more about the PKI and its failed rebellion. Meanwhile 
the witness Towidjari stated that members of the PKI who were 
still railway workerS wero instructed to continue working 
illegally for the PKI in accordance with the position of S.BKA as 
a mass organisation of the PKI. 
The most important target if necessary was to conduct sabotage 
and in its organisation there were implementing cadres. He said 
that the train accident appeared to be a tactic handed by Aidit 
to Djoko Sumbul who gave evidence in Solo on 18 October 
1965. 
This case also demonstrates the important fact that wben 
the defence counsel does not have proper access to wit-
nesses, the court can so arrange the presentation of 
evidence as to severely damage the defence case. 
Exhibits 
There have been many cases of defence counsel rejecting 
barang bukti (exhibits) produced in the trials. But accor-
ding to the HlR (Revised Procedural Code) the presiding 
judge has the ultimate discretion over evidence produced in 
court. During the trial of Njono photos of the supposedly 
mutilated bodies of the generals were shown to Njono and 
then submitted to the session as viwm et repertum (visual 
evidence). The defence counsel then asked that the doctor's 
post mortem report also be submitted, because it was 
known that this report had shown that the bodies were not 
mutilated as the government contended. The judge th.en 
said that this report was inadmissabie and could not be 
submitted as evidence as Njono was not being charged with 
murder.82 
In the trial of Ascp Suryaman, the defence rejected the 
exhibits as unlawful evidence as they were not accompanied 
by ~ document of confiscation signed by the accused. Asep 
derued that the weapons and pamphlets on di5play were 
hi$,83 but to no avail. In the same case the prosecutor 
stated with regard to the presentation of witnesses and 
other procedures, that if all regulations were observed it 
would retard th; processes of the hearings, thus prolonging 
the detention o1 the accused.84 
Presumption of Innocence 
~t is har~ly surprising that one of the most important 
issues which has emerged in the trials, has been the consis-
tent violation of the principle of the presumption of inno-
cence of the defendant, which is guaranteed in article 8 of 
Law 14/1970. Procedural irregularities have added their 
weight to the massive propaganda campaign which has been 
so prejudicial in all the G30S trials. The best illustration of 
this prac~ce comes from the trial of Asep Suryaman, where 
he and his defence counse1 took an exceptionally coura-
geous stand on the issue. According to article 289 of the 
HIR (Revised Procedural Code), 
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After all the wintesses have been examined, 1he judges shall pro-
ceed with the examination of the accused, informing him/her 
of all 1he aggravating circumstances as a result of the investiga-
tions at the hearing, 
ln other words the prosecution has to prove the guilt of the 
defendant who is accused of crimes in accordance with. the 
indictment. It has become "customary" in Indonesia since 
1950, according to . Asep's judge. Mr T. M. Abdullah to 
open the case with the examination of the accused and he 
then refused to commence with the witnesses. ' 
In order to protect his right of non-self.incrimination 
Asep was advised by his defence counsel to insist upon th~ 
correct procedure and to refuse to answer any questions 
until all the witnesses were heard. This tactic is known as 
gerakan tutup mulut-''tbe closed mouth movement". One 
of the judges then told the defendant that he was entitled 
not to speak if he so wished, but that he should be warned 
of the possible consequences if he failed to answer. The 
defence counsel, Mr Yap then warned the judge that he 
was violating his judges' oath in making this threat. None-
theless the trial proceeded as ordained, as the judges 
decreed it was sufficient to read the reports of Asep's pre-
trial interrogation as evidence. 
ln cases where the violation of article 289 is protested 
by the defence counsel, the prosecution invariably claims 
successfully that the HIR is only meant to provide "guide-
lines" (pedoman). However as S. Tasrif, the Chairman of 
the Bar Association of Indonesia (Peradin) points out, not 
only is article 8 of Law 14/1970 infringed, but also Law 
1/1950 which states that the task of the Supreme Court is 
to ensure that justice is carried out in accordance with the 
law, no matter what has become "customaryn.s5 
The PKJ Spectre 
The trials have served an important legitimating function 
for the New Order, both within Indonesia and in other 
countries. The major issue connected with political 
imprisonment has been the plight of the prisoners detained 
without trial, while in the case of the others it has been 
seen that justice at least appeared to have been done. How· 
ever the trials have played an even more important, in fact 
a critical tole in Indonesia's post 1965 politics. They have 
kept alive a spectre. While the obliteration of the PK.I as a 
legal and popular party was complete it was necessary to 
give it life in another fotm, and so the PKI now lives on as 
a "communist threat" or as "communist subversion", thus 
providing the basis of an impressive and multi-purpose 
apparatus of political contro1. The penalties associated with 
the PKI are so well known that people will go to great 
lengths to avoid this stigma and the suffering it involves. 
Not only is the PK.I-sanction effective as a central 
government policy, but it is used by individuals for their 
own gain, and thus accounts for the pervasiveness of its use. 
Army officers have reported that they have "defeated" 
imaginary "advancing communist units" or .. underground 
communists". 86 This language conceals the arrests and 
killing of innocent villagers and at the stune time earns 
commendations and even promotions for over-zealous army 
officers. 
At all sorts of levels, the enforcement of government 
policy also depends on the PKI sanction. For example 
women who refuse to participate in government birth-
control programmes become "PKl-sympathisers", and 
workers who are laid off without pay become the same if 
they protest. Government officials who come to inform 
peasants that t11ey must give up their land for some govern-
ment project, do not hesitate to use explicitly the PKI-
sanction. Peasants who protest at the meagre compensation 
handed out by the government are instantly branded as 
PKI. On 25 July 1979, for example a number of peasants 
from Janggawah (Jember) East Java, were arrested after 
they had protested against the efforts of the State Tobacco 
Plantation No . 27 to plough up their crops,87 Following 
the incid~nt, Major-General Witannin, the Commander of 
the East Java Military Command, who mobilised the troops 
which crushed the peasant demonstration asserted, 
... the1e is clearly collaboration between political paity 
elements to utilise this case for their political interests. Besides 
this, we must be vlgilant of the wk of G30S/PXI elements who 
are also utilising this case in the inte,iests of their strategy of 
struggle. The role of G30S/PKI elements 1s clear because an ex-
BTI (the now banned Peasants' Union-trans.) member who is 
requited to report regularly was active in this incident. One of 
the persons mobilising the muses was also an ex-BTI/PKl 
person, and the region where it occurred wu indeed a .BTI/PKI 
stronghold in fom1er days, The kind of mass action employed is 
clearly similar to that employed by the PKI during the old 
order.88 
Some days later, Kompas which carried this report revealed 
the difficulties of the press :in such cases, and unusually, 
did not mince words: 
ft is necessary for us to be somewhat cautious when discussing 
the Jcnggawah incident, especially following the official state-
ment made by the Brawijaya (East Java.) Military Conun.and to 
the effect that BTI elements were involved. With this, we are, as 
it were, placed befo1e a formidable and impregnable wall. 89 
Not missing a golden opportunity, foreign companies 
have also found out tl1at recalcitrant workers can be con-
trolled effectively with the PKI-sanction. Particu1arly vul-
nerable to this are fonner political prisoners, for example 
those who are working in what amounts to forced-labou1 
camps in foreign-owned timber concessions in Kalimantan. 
Berita Yudha, tl1e army daily, reported an incident where 
military intervention was used against P. T. Cidatin/Cita 
workers in I<a1imantan. A security patrol had arrested a 
worker who had allegedly left his work-place in the foresl, 
and the validity of the arrest was questioned by a workers' 
representative as he worked near logging ponds. Betita 
Yudha claimed in the accounts90 that police security forces 
receive Rp 30,000 a month from the company. Although 
the timber workers had merely protested at arbitrary para-
military intervention, they were accused by the manager 
of P. T. Ci ta Timber of being "PKI inspired". 
Now that all the B-Category prisoners are said to have 
been re1eased, the government has been quick to brand 
them as future scapegoats in the continuing wave of 
workers' protests which now shakes Indonesia, and the PKI 
sanction will continue to be used against them: 
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"The entire state apparatus must intensify vigilance in exercising 
supervision of the released B-CBteiozy C30S/PKI prisoners. Do 
not relax in preventing outlawed ex-PKI asph'ations from infil-
trating and from mobilising forces", declared Gener.al 
Panggabean, Co-ordinating Mi.nistet for Defence and Security. 
He was speaking a.t a meeting of co-ordinating ministers cha.iied 
by President Suharto held at the end of June. 
Acting Information Minister, General Sudharmono, reporting 
thla stem warning. said that it was directed not only at officials 
.respondbte for secutjty and regional government affairs but also 
those in other sectors. He specifically mentioned the labour 
sector which "should not be utilised" pointing out that "past 
events should not be allowed to recur".91 
In its most violent manifestation since 1965, the use of 
the communist threat justified the Indonesian invasion of 
East Timor and the subsequent massacre of at least 100,000 
people. Without the .. PKI menace" and the original founda-
tion of the G30S/P.KI theory, this justification could never 
have been effective. Although the justification has been 
regarded with some scepticism overseas. within Indonesia 
itself it has been remarkably effective in ensuring the ignor-
ance of even senior officials and politicians about the New 
Order's genocide in East Timor. 
Apart from the trials of well-known PKI leaders and 
sympathisers already discussed, there have been numerous 
and continuing trials conducted under the PKI rubric. In 
these .. subversion" and .. sabotage•• are favourite chaiges. 
Reports of these trials tend to be bland and perfunctory, 
but they always include the charge and usually the 
sentence. Such trial_s help t.o keep the PKI spectre aliYe and 
to reinforce a theory which has served the New Order well 
for fourteen yea.rs. The foregoing account has one main 
sobering message. While there is good reason to rejoice 
about the releases of so many political priS<>ners, the re. 
joicing should not be unqualified, for the tragedy of G30S 
has by no means come to an end. 
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REX MORTIMER 
Tht death of Rex Mortimer on New Year's Eve from 
cancer has rneanl the loss of a dedi1:aletl scholar and 
of a man who was deeply concerned about oppression 
and cxploilation. Bis work wa:-. directed towards 
11nderstanding and confronting these evils, and the 
analysis of other philosophical and practical attem ~lts 
to deal with them. lndoncsia was a particularly 
important focus of his concern. 
Rex was the author of the very significant stmJy, 
Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology 
and Politi<:s, 1959-1965 (1974 , Cornell University 
Prc~s) and the con tribu ting edilm of Showcase Stare: 
The lllusiou of Indonesia's 'Accelerated Mode?llisa· 
tion' (1973 , Angus and Robertson). He also produced 
numerous, much-<liscusse<l articles and seminar 
papers. His work had a unique Rc:!l Mortimer style .. 
and was reflective, incisive, controvc1sial and always 
stimulating. As a teacher he won the respect and 
affe.:tion of students, some or whom he inspired with 
a lasting interest in Indonesia . Many former students 
will remember his remarkable ability to offer detailed 
and well-founded criticism, while never discomaging 
or belittling their efforts. 
Despite the pain and mental anguish Rex suffeced 
in his last months, he bore his illness with incredible 
courage and with determination to complete as much 
of a formidable array of self-imposed tasks as 
possible, while also spending as much time as he 
could with his family, and writing to his friends. 
Many people will cherish the memory of a much-
loved friend and of a dedicated man of great warmth 
and humour. We feel his loss greatly . 
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still living -at the Savana Jaya unit on Buru island as well as 
89 released tapols who are said to have 'opted' to remain 
there when the final batch of releases from Buru took place 
on 13 November last (Kompas, 22 November, 1979). 
The "Unco~perative" 105 
In addition to the general discriminatory restrictions im-
posed on all released tapols, the last 105 tapols to be 
released are required to report weekly to the military 
authorities and have been told that they will be under 
specially close surveillance. The group includes a number of 
well-known prisoners: the novelist Pramoedya Ananta 
Toer, the poet Rivaj Apin, woman's activist Dr Tanti Aidit 
(widow of the murdered chainnan of the Indonesian Com-
munist Party). journalists Naibaho and Hasyiln Rachman, 
as well as a number of workers, peasants, students, school-
pupils and government employees. Several official explana-
tions of their ''unco-operativeness" have been given. Brig· 
General Gunarso, Defence Ministry spokesman claimed that 
they had refused to sign loyalty oaths but this turned out 
to be untrue. General Yoga Sugama, KOPKAMTIB's Ch.ief-
of-Staff then claimed that they .. still strongly support the 
PKI's right to exist even though it has been banned" 
(Kompas, 22 November 1979). 
Their eventual release came after it had been asserted 
that they would not be freed until they "changed their 
attitudes". But when international concern was expressed 
over this back-tracking, it was decided to release them after 
all though they will be required to report weekly till 
"their attitudes change". Their eventual release proves yet 
again that international pressure has played a decisive role 
at every stage. 
Discrepancies in Figures Continue 
In TAPOL Bulletin No. 35, it was shown that of the 12,146 
tapols acknowledged by KOPKAMTIB at the end of 1978, 
only 9 562 were accounted for in the figures it gave in April 
1979 ~hen the release of 1,259 tapols left the total official 
figure at only 8,303. Discrepancy: 2,584 
In TAPOL Bulletin No. 36, it was shown that the release of 
4,000 in September left a further discrepancy of 149 tapols: 
May 1979 official figure 8,303 
September releases 4,000 
4,303 
New official figures after 
September releases 4,154 Discrepancy: 149 
The releases that have taken place in November and 
December, the dosing stages of the release plan, continue 
to leave discrepancies: 
Sept 1979 official figure 4,154 
November releases 1,874* 
2,280 
•s9 of these releases remained on Bum. 
New official figure after 
November releases 
December releases 
New official figure after 
December releases 
2 ,211 Discrepancy: 69 
2,045 
166 
128 Discrepancy: 38· 
The remaining 128 were said to consist of the 105 °unco-
operative" B-Category tapols who were released on 20 
December and 23 A-Category prisoners, awaiting trial. 
This le;ves a total of 259 tapols unaccounted for since 
May last year or altogether 2,843 unaccounted fo~ since the 
end of 1978. It is difficult to comprehend how KOPKAM-
TIB figures, announced on each occasion with such 
authority and precision, have every time been proved wrong 
by their own subsequent figures. StatiStically, there is every 
reason to doubt KOPKAMTIB's claim that there are no 
more B-Category prisoners. 
Tried Prisoners and Those Awaiting Trial 
At the time of the first December releases, Admiral 
Sudomo announced (Sinar Harapan, 10 December 1979) 
that a total of 1,014 persons had been tried since 1966. 
Apparently there had been no acquittals for he went on to 
state that 262 persons had qow completed their sentences 
while the remaining 752 were still serving sentences in 
prison. 
The number of A~ategory prisoners dropped· dramati-
cally over the year, as the following official figures show: 
End of 1978 1.391 




It is not clear how many of these vanishing prisoners 
were tried (few trials were reported in the press during 
1979) and how many were re-classified to B. The rate of re-
classification has apparently been very high despite KOP-
KAMTIB's consistent claims that it had "sufficient evi-
dence" to prove the guilt of these prisoners. 
Remissions 
A major change for tried tapols is the long-delayed decision 
to allow them remlssion. In November 1979, President 
Suharto is reported (Tempo, 29 December 1979) to have 
instructed the Minister of Justice to grant remissions to 
political prisoners in line with normal practice for other 
prisoners. Until then, only one tried prisoner had obtl,lined 
remission, and then only after vigorous efforts by his 
family. The decision to grant remission comes too }ate to 
benefit a considerable number of prisoners who received 
sentences of relatively shorter duration and who served 
their sentences to the full. 
Tempo ( 5 January 1980) reports that 331 tried tapols 
have been granted remission. For 118, this meant 
immediate release; 20 people serving life sentences had their 
sentences reduced to twenty years. Tempo also reports that 
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a number of cases which had been sent to the courts for 
trial were Withdrawn. These included the cases of Dr TanU 
Aidit and D. P. Karim, journalist, both of whom were 
released in December. General Yoga Sugama is quoted by 
Tempo as saying that it was not certain that all the 
remaining 23 A-category prisoners would in fact be tried. 
"If it is thought". says Tempo "that the sentence they will 
get is less than the period they have already spent in deten· 
tion, then they will be released." . 
Assuming that it is correct to consider the 118 released 
as a result of remissions as being in addition to the 262 
tried persona mentioned by Admiral Sudomo as having 
been released already, it means that 634 tapols are still 
sel'\'ing sentences. 
PROTESTORS GREET SUHARTO 
During President Suharto's State Visit to Britain bst 
November, a number of demonstrations l\"efe held. The 
largest, in which about three hundred people took part, 
was held outside the Guildhall, as Suharto was being feted 
by London's Lord Mayor. 
Press coverage of the demonstrations was good, far better 
indeed than the preu coverage afforded to Suharto. A 
complete &et of clippings is available for the price of tl.50 
to pay for photocopying, plus postage, 
'TEMPO~ PUBLISHES LEITER FROM T APOL 
Kami (Tapol) Tidak Anti Translation 
Pickets outside Downing street. 
·Berhubung atribut 'inti-lndonesla' yang 
diberikan kepada T APOL (M1!inbala1 Kun- · 
jUJtgrm Rotu, 'TEMPO 17 Novembei-}, perlu 
kami jeJaskan: bahwa yang ditentang T APOL 
.adalah sistem represi yang dijal-ankan Peme-
rintah Indonesia sekanng lnl, baik terhadap 
tahanan G30S/PKI maui;un terhadap gerakan 
mahaslswa serta lain-lain golongan yang ber-
usana rnemperjuangkan haknya. Jadi, TAPOL 
sama sekali tidak bersikap anti-Indonesia. 
Bahkan seballknya - karena kaml yakin 
bM!wa represi sepenuhnya bertent;mgan de· 
ngan kepribadian Indonesia. 
We (TAPOL) Are Not Anti 
Perlu dljelasbn pula, bultan hanya 
T APO!- Yang meng;ldak.an protes selama kun-
jungan Presiden Suharto ke Jnggris. Organi· 
sui yang ikut alctif berdemonstrasi meliputi 
antau lain: Cmtferentt on Bllsk llltd J>ernQ-
t:l'lltic Ri8hn in tire ASEAN Alliance, li~­
r11.tion, th~ Bririzh Oimpafgn for an Jndepen-
d~nt Ealt Ti1'IOI', the Omtpal.in Ag11inst the 
Arnu Trade, Third World First, ~rta berba· 
gal serikat buruh termasuk TrtllUport d: Ge-




·gA Treport Street SWt& 2BP, 
London, United Kingdom. 
fn connection with the adjective 'anti-Indonesian' which was attributed to 
TAPOL ("Returning the Queen's Visit", Tempo, 17 November 1979), we 
should explain that what T APOL is opposed to is the system of repression 
operated by the present Indonesian Government, both towards G30S/PK1 
prisoners as well as towards the student movement and other groups trying 
to defend their rights. Thus, T APOL is in no way anti-Indonesian. In fact, 
the contrazy is true, because we are convinced that repression is com-
pletely out of keeping with the Indonesian identity. 
It should also be explained that TAPOL was not the only organisation 
ta protest during President Suharto's visit to Britain. Organisations which 
took an active part in the demonstrations included: the Conference on 
Basic and Democratic Rights in the ASEAN Alliance, Liberation, the 
British Campaign fot an Independent East 1Ymor, the Campaign Against 
the Arms Trade, Third World Fint, as well as \tarious trade unions, 
including the Transport and General Worken' Union, Britain's largest 
union. 
Tempo 29 December 1979 
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POLITICAL EXILES MAY RETURN BUT .•. 
The BBC Short wave Monitoring Bulletin reported on 
3rd January ~980 that 
Antara news agency teported General Yoga Sugaina, 
Commander of the State Security Command and Otlef of 
State Intelligence, as dating that all political fugitives who 
had left Indonesia -after the attempted coup of 1965 were 
alloWed to return but would be stlbject to "lntertogation 
by the authorities". lnve$tigatioru would show whether 
they should be detained or "acquitted" (sic). 
Many thousands of Indonesians are now living abroad 
as political refugees. One who did decide to return 
home in 1977, Brigadier--General Suharjo, was 
arrested immediately on his arrival in Jakarta. It was 
recently announced that he is soon to be tried; he is 
now listed as one of the 23 A-category tapols. 
continued from page 1 
yem. Furthennore, student unions are stepping up oppo-
sition to the government-imposed "normalisation" of 
the campuses, and renewed repression could occur any day; 
a nwnber of students have already been su~pended from 
their studies and two student leaders have died in sus-
piciously similar "accidents". 
Worker and peasant actions in defence of their bask 
rights are heavily repressed with the authorities frequently 
invoking the PK.I spect1e to justify imprisonment. As 
economic conditions deteriorate, such actions are cerUtin to 
increase, with the likelihood af more victims. 
East Timor 
Massive and brutal xepression continues against all who 
resist the takeover by Indonesia. The death toll is horren· 
dous (some estimate it to be as much as half the popula-
tion). Some of those captured are being held as political 
prisoners, though many are known to have been executed 
or to have died under torture. An estimate of the numbers 
being held in detention is virtually impossible because of 
the tight blockade. In addition, hundreds of thousands are 
being held against their will in "strategic camps", in condi-
tions of widespread disease and starvation. These are all 
victims of Indonesian repression and can only be freed by 
strong intemational pressure. 
West Irian (West Papua) 
Here too, resistance to Indonesian rule is met with brutal 
repression. Whatever one may think of the West 'Papuan 
people's demand fot secession, they have a right to struggle 
for this demand, as Indonesians had a right to demand 
independenec from the Dutch. An estimated 90,000 have 
been killed since the installation of Indonesian rule in 1963, 
and 1,500 are thought to be being held, the vast majority 
without trial. A campaign to stop this rep1ession and to 
release these prisoners is long overdue. 
Dissolve KOPKAMTIB and End Repression 
The only way to end all forms of repression in Indonesia 
is to dissolve KOPKAMTIB, the Army's special security 
command. which st.ands outside and above the law. Not 
until KOPKAMTIB ceases to exist and the rule of law is 
allowed to operate without l.hterference from the Execu-
ti\IC will it be possible to stop campaigning, in Indonesia as 
well as abroad. 
A MILUON CHINESE TO BE REPATRIATED 
P1ans to repatriate one million Chinese from Indonesia wer 
were announced by General Yoga Sugama, Chief-of-Staff 
of KOPXAMTIB, at a meeting with the Defence and 
Foreign Affairs Commission of Parliament on 28th Novem-
ber, 1979 (Guardian Reuter, 29 November, 1979). The 
government would, he said "set aside specially designated 
areas for the non-Indonesian Chinese pending their repatria-
tion", and added that all Peking passport holders were in 
the process of being re-registered to determine their exact 
number, family status and employment. 
According to the Far Eastern Economic Reyiew (4 
January, 1980) the decision applies to all "all ethnic 
Chinese who refuse to Indonesian citizenship" and would 
include repatriation not only to mainland Chin.a but also to 
Taiwllll. 
General Sugama is reported to have told parliamenta-
rians that the repatriation programme would be completed 
by 1984, the final year of Indonesia's current five-year 
plan. 
Reports that all three million ethnic Chinese in 
lndonesia are required to re-register were published earlier 
in 1979. According to Henry Kamm {New York Times, 
31 May, 1979), re-registration is costly and frustr2ting. a 
29-page questionnaire must be completed, a $4 fe.e paid to 
«cover costs" and photocopies of birth, death, marriage and 
name-change certificates as well as identity cards and busi· 
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